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Difference between algorithmic processing and the process of
Lifeworld (Lebenswelt)
Domenico Schneider
Technische Universität Braunschweig,

Abstract
The following article compares the temporality of the life-world with the digital
processing. The temporality of the life-world is determined to be stretched and
spontaneous. The temporality of the digital is given by discrete step-by-step points of
time. Most ethical issues can be traced back to a mismatch of these two ways of
processing. This creates a foundation for the ethics of the digital processing.
Methodologically, phenomenological considerations are merged with mediaphilosophical considerations in the article.
Keywords: processing of human-computer interaction, process philosophical
perspective, pragmatism, social philosophy, phenomenology

Processes are the fundamental aspects in our daily life-world. They are part of our
bodily movements. Thoughts and perceptions can be better described through
processes and language in the form of a speech or an act of writing represents a
process. All these processes of our cultural self-understanding are subject to different
kinds of changes. These changes can be different. One way of change is given by the
innate and pure social upheavals of society (Mead, 1938). Another way of changing is
the modification of our behavior due to techn ical innovations (Montag, 2018). Ultimately,
these two ways of changes are increasingly interconnected. A technical renewal is the
digitization of our society, which is given by the increasing networking since the 1980s.
In the following article I will compare the different kinds of processes: the pure social
and bodily process of our daily routine and the process of digitized environment. With
this juxtaposition, I do not want to claim that there is a strict separation between a
normal life-world and a digitized world. In fact, it would be utterly misleading to claim
that our current life-world is separate from a digital world. Nevertheless, on a
fundamental ontological level there is a strict distinction between the digital processes
and the other non-digital interaction patterns. This strict distinction is the source of most
of the ethical issues associated with digitization. That leads me to my general thesis:
Most ethical problems concerning digitization are rooted in change of different kind of
process (process of life-world vs. digitized process algorithm and database).
Given this thesis my article seeks to lay the groundwork for the most ethical
problem of modern society, as far as they are concerned with digitization. In doing so, I
will concentrate on the progressive and existing types of digitization. First of all, these
are (1) digitization in the literal sense, (2) datafication, (3) communication and (4)
networking. A lot of discussion is heavily influenced by science fiction, such as fully
autonomous cars or humanoid robots. Consequently, starting an ethical consideration

should start at the points, events, places that are real. Since most technical projects,
such as humanoid robots and fully autonomous cars, are still research, I will
concentrate on the mentioned areas of digitization (1-4).

History of acceleration
With the beginning of modernity in the 18th century in human history, there are two
crucial events that have led to an acceleration – or let's say change – of humanenvironment or human-human interaction. The first event is given by the whole process
of industrialization which starts with machines and the steam engine and ends with the
development of the assembly line. Certainly these are the main events, which are
additionally accompanied by urbanization, electrification and an increased mobilization
of our society. Looking at the change in the early 1990s human society has received an
immense acceleration of its ways of acting and communicating. Therefore, the second
phase is given by the computer technology and the Internet. Of course, before the
development of the Internet, there was a preform of a networked society (Standage,
1998). But this preform was not accessible to all and was not given by an
omnipresence, which is ensured by the mobile technology. For all further
considerations, it must be taken into account that this second phase of digitization has
not finished.
Therefore, I would like to start with a motivation, why it is also necessary to look
at processes. This consideration consist of some examples, which, on the one hand, we
can experience in our daily routine and has already changed our normal interaction with
other humans, with our environment and with technical devices. On the other hand, I
would like to look at a few examples concerning the upheavals of society as a whole.
Examples of an accelerated Life-World
Firstly, Communication of small/medium-sized business and big companies (concerns)
has speed up because of an increasing number of email transmission of every kind:
customer questions, tickets for traveling or entertainment, organization with public
institutions and so on. To give an idea of the change, some numbers are mentioned the
rising amount of emails. The numbers are for Germany: in the year 2000, we have 32,2
Billion emails, in 2005 131,9 Billion, in 2010 317,6 Billion, in 2015 544,2 Billion, and in
the last year 2018 848,1 Billion (Statista, 2019). It is an exponential growi ng of the
amount of transmitted emails. The common communication like text messaging like
SMS, WhatsApp etc. are not yet counted. It is self-evident that this last way of
communicating is even more accelerating on our ways of life.
Secondly, the same as for ordinary email is true for social media: in all social
communication, we have an increasing amount of connection to fellow human beings,
friends, colleagues and family members. This way of communication does not only take
place on personal computers, but is being carried out by mobile phone devices in public
space. We can find a reduction in attention for the real environment, but an acceleration
of text messaging in public communication. This way of communication is accompanied
by a constant focus on the mobile phone. You can see them everywhere, smobies lost
in their smartphones. In some cities like Amsterdam or Cologne the public traffic

administration has reacted to this new kind of behavior: They have built traffic lights in
the ground at the pedestrian. It protects these unwary people not been killed from cars,
because the gaze is directed downwards when operating the phone. This example
shows that we have also in certain sense a slowing down of time consciousness,
because the activity or arousal for the real environment is reduced. Nevertheless, we
can find an accelerated way of communication due to digitized networking.
In the field of health through digital introspection, changes in health can be
registered faster independently and individually. Speeding up a stimulus-responsemechanism between agents and their bodies is instanced and partly tracked by the
healthcare industry: self-monitoring of health but also robots database (deep medicine)
can speed up diagnosis of illness or bodily analysis. These kinds of analysis of health
process are mainly given by digitized monitoring. It results in an accelerated body
understanding, which can give you a permanent data feedback.
The fourth example deals with communication itself: We can find a language or
linguistic change. On the one hand autocomplete or word completion speeds up humancomputer interaction. Sometimes this can be really helpful, but it also changes the way
how we speak and how we read. There are research about a reduced capability of
reading and understanding complex text, which is associated with th e fact, that text
messages are more and more incomplete. Furthermore, text messaging consists of
smaller pieces of text, so that smaller pieces are sent and read. Consequently, digitized
messaging has an influence of the language as a process. Furthermore, there a power
policy problem can be found: all text and word assistance are mainly in private hand of
huge firms, like google. There is a shift of power regarding language.
Fifth example looks at social philosophical aspects of society as a whole process:
With the digitization and mainly because of networking we have an immense change of
the world of work: We find an increase in low paid jobs, where people have no contact
at all with the manufacturing process of the products. Typically, deliveryman an d woman, Warehouse and logistics workers are completely taken out of the value chain of
the manufacturing. It is true that this can not entirely trace back to the process of
digitization. But the increased networking and the increased consumerism favor th is
development.
The sixth example looks at trading. Since the late 1980s beside normal trading,
high frequency trading becomes more important at finance markets. The trading is done
by computer programs in a range of milliseconds below the threshold of consciousness
for human decision making. Normal human trades have no chance. There is a huge
discussion, whether high frequency trading really helps to improve trading at all.
Nevertheless, some financial crashes are produced by high frequency trading; for
example a brief but dramatic stock market crash of May 6, 2010 was caused by high frequency trading. The Dow Jones Industrial Average plunged to its largest intraday
point loss, but not percentage loss, in history, only to recover much of those losses
within minutes. Here we can see that with new digitized technology another type of
dynamical risk occurs, which can influence or attack our normal life-world.
The seventh example reflects the increase in consumerism, which is responsible
for all the negative effects on the environment and nature. In the 21st century's
globalized economy, consumerism has become a noticeable part of our western culture.
That is because of an incredible network and an immense data base in all sectors of

economics. Digitization helps to increase trading and in a certain sense welfare, but it
also does not really help to reduce rubbish or CO2 reduction, since we start to buy stuff
that we do not need to impress people we mostly not like. Here we find a really
important ethical conflict which can best describe by change of processes. This last
example also shows the connection between the transformation of digital processing
(accelerated consumption due to digital cyberculture) and ou r behavior in society
(increased consumption behavior). In all likelihood, most of the associated
environmental and climate problems can only be resolved if we return to local and
decentralized production and trade, which also takes into account the season al
conditions. But this reversal would mean th at we would have to negate and discard our
self-evident way of digital consumerism.
A process-philosophical foundation for ethical problems of digitization
All of these leads me to my general thesis: Most ethical problems concerning digitization
are rooted in change of different kind of process (process of life-world vs. digitized
process algorithm and database)

Overview in process-philosophical thinking
In this second part of my article I will give a short overview in process philosophical
thinking. This overlay provides a brief historical description of the main stage. It is
selective and does not claim to be complete. However, what should be newly developed
is the perspective on the processes of digital and technical devices. For the most part, it
is only applied to cognitive or mental processes, perception, emotions or entactivistic
models (human-environment or human-human interaction). Essentially, I would like to
establish a connection between process-philosophical explanations of our way of being
(Rescher, 2000) and a media-philosophical interpretation of our technical and digital
devices (Simondon, 2012; Stiegler, 2018; Kittler, 1985; Winkler, 2015). Again, this can
only be formulated as a rough idea and forms an aspect that is in the background of the
main thesis formulated above.
Some historical remarks on process philosophy – Greek philosophy
In general, we can say that process philosophically thinking starts with the following
idea or better say fundamental observation: instead of reducing reality to a permanent
substance all reality is grounded as changes, variations, alterations, modifications,
transformations: or to say it in one word: all is explainable by processes. This paradigm
goes back to famous and well-known creek philosophically statements of time. It is from
Heraclitus's concept of πάντα ῥεῖ:
All entities move and nothing remains still (Plato, 1998, p. 401d)
Everything changes and nothing remains still ... and ... you cannot step twice
into the same stream (Plato, 1998, p. 402a)

You can find these quotations in Plato's Cratylus. Plato itself can not seen as full
process philosopher, because he believes more in unchangeable ideas. The same is
true for Aristotle, but we can find in fourth book of his Physics (Φυσικὴ ἀκρόασις,
Phusike akroasis) some analysis of time and change which is close to a concept of
process and already gives us some problems. Two problems have to be highlighted
here. First, processes always have something to do with the temporality of something.
Second, time itself has something to do with changeability, and generally, a distinction
is made between subjective time and objective time. Aristotle himself addresses these
issues and notes the following inconsistency between time, movement and change. On
the one hand we can read, that change and movement is not identical with time.
Aristotle writes:
Again, ... change is always faster or slower, whereas time is not: for ‘fast’ and
‘slow’ are defined by time — ‘fast’ is what moves much in a short time, ‘slow’
what moves little in a long time; but time is not defined by time, by being
either a certain amount or a certain kind of it. (Aristotle, 1987, p. 218b12- 219a3)
On the other hand, time needs something that change. Aristotle says:
But neither does time exist without change; for when the state of our own
minds does not change at all, or we have not noticed its changing, we do not
realize that time has elapsed, [...] (Aristotle, 1987, p. 218b12- 219a3)
The problem consists of the fact that change can not reduce to time, but it has
something to do with time. In the following we have to keep this paradox in the
background: There is an implicit connection between change and time, but it can not be
used as an explicit definition of one for the other. To return to the common distinction
between objective and subjective time, we will see that the very temporality of the digital
has an influence on subjective temporality.
Some historical remarks on Process Philosophy – The Development since the
Enlightenment
It is clear that even in the Middle Ages a whole series of thinkers dealt with processes
and temporality. Augustine's Confessiones in particular, with the ninth and eleventh
books, represent an important contribution to temporality and memory (Augustine,
2013). But much of the results of the medieval ways of thinking remains in the
protection and foundation of the essence of God. No independent reflections on the
concepts of the process and temporality itself are made. Since the enlightenment we
have some important philosophers and thinkers that all have a concept of processes
which is a key term in their theories. Only in the Enlightenment, processing is worked
out as an independent topos and operationally integrated into the thinking of philosophy.
With his theory of monades Leibniz develops a concept of a bunch of processes
that define all substances (Leibniz, 1996). This concept results in the so called prestable
harmony of all entities. Clearly we can find in his works an understanding of dynamics,
mutability and changeableness of all being, which is given by constantly unfolding
potentialities. Schelling wrote a biophysical article, where he tries to establish a physical

foundation of all organism which goes back to the processes of life of organism:
Allgemeine Deduction des dynamischen Processes oder der Categorien der Physik,
(Schelling, 1800). This article includes a recollection of the processes as a basic way to
put categories in biology or biophysics.
In his book The Birth of Tragedy from the Spirit of Music, Nietzsche develops a
concept of affirming the of passing by (Bejahung des Vergehens). This concept goes
back to the fact that there is a will to live that is governed by a drive or better say
impetus. Nietzsche also brings this idea to Bergson's élan vital (Bergson, 1907), which
is often misunderstood as a force. Rather, both concepts aim at the constant re-creation
of the living in every situation. Repetitions are not excluded, but both insist on a
constant becoming of all situations as a creative and individual moment. We will see
that this concept of becoming can not be reconciled with digital manipulation and
processing.
Alfred North Whiteheads Process and Reality is seen as the first book which
concentrate all central ideas of process philosophically thinking (Whitehead, 1929). It is
cosmological approach: The whole nature is a process in total. It can be shown that
Whitehead was inspired by Bergson's ideas, but he certainly expands the idea of the
process by considering the inorganic world. In addition, he also takes into account the
communication and use of symbols. As a result, he also looks at historical and
communicative processes and thus expands the considerations of a philosophy of
processes. Overall, Whitehead takes into account the cultural processes and also links
them to the natural processes.
In modern philosophy the US-American philosopher Nicolas Rescher starts the
philosophical movement. He published introduction into this way of philosophical
thinking. Going back to Rescher, we can first give an etymological examination of the
term process. Etymologically, the word process goes back to the Latin term: procedere.
It means as much as “go forward”, “a development”, “progress”, “trend” or “course of
something”, which takes time. Rather than tease other important philosophers of the
processes, I would rather like to give a summary quote from Rescher's book Process
Philosophy – A Survey of Basic Issues:
A process is an actual or possible occurrence that consists of an integrated
series of connected development unfolding in programmatic coordination: an
orchestrated series of occurrences that are systematically linked to one another
either causally or functionally. Such a process need not necessarily be change in
an individual thing or object but can simply relate to some aspect of the general
“condition of things” – for example, a change in the temperature or in the
purchasing power of money. (Rescher, 2000, p. 22)
In general, we can say that the classical Latin expression operari sequitur esse is
reverse: the new paradigm of process-philosophical thinking is esse sequitur operari
(Rescher, 2000, p. 10). As mentioned above, more thinkers could certainly be counted,
but Rescher's work should not be repeated here. It is important to me to reproduce
some concepts only in keywords and at the same time to add some philosophers who
can not be found in Rescher's work. In addition, in the course of further consideration, I
dwell on thinkers who can better complement th e idea, that is developed in this article.

The Life-World
Philosophical Definition of Life-World is given by Edmund Husserl and, in a nutshell, the
life-world goes back to the everyday non -scientistic perspective of our environment and
surrounding. A strict distinction between a world of mere objects and a subjective mode
of perception is rejected by Husserl. Rather, the life-world already exists in an a priori
understanding of the correlative relationship between the objects and the modes of
perception. This understanding is not only sociological but always historically grown. In
the anthology Husserliana XXXIX Die Lebenswelt Husserl combines historical
descriptions with everyday situate explanations. This exposition of meaning (Freilegung
des Sinns) is provided by the phenomenological method. The general concept of lifeworld can be found in his famous later work: The Crisis of European Sciences and
Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy.
Husserl starts with a general critique of the so called sciences of facts
(Tatsachenwissenschaften) do not look at the foundation of everyday life-world:
In unserer Lebensnot – so hören wir – hat diese Wissenschaft uns nichts zu
sagen. Gerade die Fragen schliesst sie prinzipiell aus, die für den in unseren
unseligen Zeiten den schicksalsvollsten Umwälzungen preisgegebenen
Menschen die brennenden sind: die Fragen nach Sinn oder Sinnlosigkeit dieses
ganzen menschlichen Daseins.
In our misery of life – we hear – this science has nothing to say to us. It is
precisely these questions which exclude them in principle, which are the burning
ones for the people who in the most unfortunate of times have given themselves
up to the most fateful upheavals: questions about the meaning or
meaninglessness of this whole human existence.
(Husserl IV, p. 4)
The life-world can be described as a normal style of looking at the world, which, first of
all, is experience with the living body (Leib, Leiblichkeit). The living body creates an own
system of corporeality and habitual activity, which represent a system of kinaesthetics
(Husserl IV, p. 107-109, Husserl XXXIX, p. 47-52). Of course, this system of
kinaesthetic movements is culturally shaped and determined. There is also a gradual
change in the patterns of movement, which is precisely what happens in an
interactionist sense through the use of technology. New technical innovations require
new interaction patterns. New technical innovations require new patterns of interaction
and this changes temporal structures of the life-world.
The second important aspect of life-world is the following one: the life-world is
determined by life with others (Miteinander-leben) or better say living with the others:
the others are active in the passive possession of the surrounding world, life-world in
this respect is always situated and culturally framed (HuaVI, p. 110, HuaXXXIX, p. 145170). A deeper and detailed analysis of the social aspect of living with can be fount in
Alfred Schütz's writings. He gives us a social-phenomenological approach which takes

into account that the life-world has a changeable but persitent background as dynamic
horizon, in which we live and that live with us.
Other thinkers of the life-world and the parallels to pragmatism
Maurice Merleau-Ponty establish a body schematic foundation of being in the world, the
living body is in its own relation part of the ordinary and everyday life-world, all objects
are constituted by the interaction of the body. In this sense there is a body schematic
(schéma corporel) foundation of the world, which is primordial. It goes back to
proprioception. This is important because it defines the process of the individual
behavior absolute in contact with world. It denies the classical distinction betw een body
and world:
Notre but constant est de mettre en evidence la fonction primordiale par laquelle
nous faisons exister pour nous, nous assumons l'espace, l'object ou l'instrument,
et de decrire le corps comme le lieu de cette appropriation. Or tant que nous
adressions a l'espace ou a la chose parcue, il n'etait pas facile de redecouvrir le
rapport du sujet incarne et de son monde, parce qu'il se transforme de lui -meme
dans le pur commerce du sujet epistemologique et de l'objet. En effet, le monde
naturel se donne comme existant en soi au dela de son existence pour moi,[...]
(Merleau-Ponty, 1945, p. 180)
Our constant aim is to elucidate the primary function whereby we bring into
existence, for ourselves, or take a hold upon, space, the object or the instrument,
and to describe the body as the place where this appropriation occurs. Now so
long as we considered space or the things perceived, it was not easy to
rediscover the relationship between the embodied subject and its world, because
it is transformed by its own activity into the intercourse between the
epistemological subject and the object. Indeed the natural world presents itself as
existing in itself over and above its existence for me; [...]
(Merleau-Ponty, 1958, p. 178)
Obviously there are parallels to American pragmatism. Even pragmatists like Dewey
and Mead anchor the processing in their ways of thinking. As good example the
pragmatist and social-philosopher Mead has similar ideas. In the book Mind, Self and
Society we can find a broader analysis of social human interactions. In particular, the
development of the self is subject to the relational interaction mechanisms between the
ego and the environment. The environment is not something static given, but is
constantly renewed and modified by the interactions. In Mead's remarks, the
environment is given primarily by the other people in the form of society. Their
behaviors primarily determine the behavior of the individual. Nonetheless, Mead
generally applies his ideas to nonspecific organisms, thereby formulating a broader
thesis:
The organism, then, is in a sense responsible for its environment. And since
organism and environment determine each other and are mutually dependent for

their existence, it follows that the life-process, to be adequately understood, must
be considered in terms of their interrelations. (Mead, 2015, p. 130)
Mind arises in the social process only when that process as whole enters into, or
is present in, experience of any one the given individuals involved in that process
(Mead, 2015, p. 134)
In detail, Mead tries to communicate all aspects of human human or human enviroment
relations in terms of processes. In a closer look at the communication, the significant
symbols play a prominent role. Ultimately, they represent the mediation between people
and can occur in a speech act, in writing or as a mere gesture and facial expressions.
The language itself is also subject to a process that itself is subject to change.
According to Mead, this change is in itiated by the ego in the interplay with Me. The
distinction between I and Me is only a conceptual distinction. On the one hand, the I
sets the impulses and behaving creatively towards the attitudes and gestures of others.
On the other hand, this is due to the attitudes, postures and gestures of society that
have sedimented in the individual, what Mead calls the Me. Therefore, in Mead's
reflections, one can recognize a network of processes that condition and produce each
other. But they also run quite parallel and at the same time. By a close reading of his
ideas we can summarize three import aspects, which takes the symbolic interaction as
a process into account:
1) Symbolic interaction but also bodily interactions are given by human body as
an integrated and situated organism. The interrelation defines all objects.
2) Since symbolic and bodily interactions are always processes all objects of the
life-world are given in terms of processes.
3) Consciousness is constituted by the change of society.
The Time Structure of the Life-world
When we talk about life-world as a process of human – and it does not matter which
area we address here: perception, bodily interactions with human or devices or
symbolic interactions – we must consider time and in a certain sense time
consciousness. All process of human interaction but also all sensory perception are not
given by isolated points of time. All is given by Gestalt structures. We already have
modes of formation that are organismic. Thus, the world is always conveyed through
shapes and symbols anchored in our organic structure. But these structures have their
own way of unfolding and establishing an organismic time. For perception, there are a
number of examples that illustrate the difference to a purely physical time. By physical
time we mean a pure meaningless sequence of now points (Jetztpunkte), which does
not provide an inner structure and connection among these now points. Take for
example hearing a melody, but it also works for hearing a talk: To u nderstand the
melody requires more than the mere sequence of disjointed sounds as nowpoints. In his
phenomenology of inner time consciousness Husserl offers a doctrine of protention,
retention and pro-impression or origin impression (Urimpression), which must be

accepted as conditions for the accomplishment of consciousness (Husserl, 1969, 2000).
At the same time, protention and retention are a mere directionality of the
consciousness, which anticipates or arrests modified or passed contents of
consciousness in a modified way. In the narrower sense, the protention and retention
lack the so-called correlation-a-priori (Korrelations-a-priori). The correlation a-priori
consists in the double relatedness of noema and noesis. Normally, for every content of
consciousness (noema), there is a structuring mode with regard to the manner of
appearance and process-like unfolding (noesis). Since the intention of retention and
retention is mere directionality, they lack the noema. In other words, retention and
protention are part of the neotic structuring of consciousness. Shaun Gallagher has
expanded these considerations with regard to physical considerations, and the body
also has a protention and retention double structure in terms of body movements
(Gallagher, 2006, p. 189-200):
a)
b)

protentional → anticipatory force of sensomotor behavior
retentional → continuous keeping of sensomotor behavior

We can thus formulate an important intermediate result: Time consciousness is always
extended and is given by protentional an d retentional structure of consciousness
(Husserl) or the biological time of life in the form of duration or durée (Bergson,1889) is
a particular mode of temporalizing. We have to separate this way of temporal structuring
from technical time structuring.
Husserl (Husserl, 1969, 2000) gives us a diagram of time consciousness (Figure
1) which describe the fact that in every now point we also have a retentional
intentionality which is different from the ordinary remembrance or memory. The
horizontal line represent the objective time line (AP) of now points and in vertical line we
draw down a line which represent the retentional consciousness of passed point of time.
For each nowpoint (E), therefore, there is a retention directionality (A', P', and A'P') that
belongs to it.

Figure 1
I would like to summarize the key messages of this section. Human time consciousness
is an anticipatory power which is not just an image or likelihood, it is also felt according
to the flow of Gestalt structures. This concept is also applied to bodily movement and
interaction with technical devices or computer. Gallagher extends Husserl's ideas to all

kinds of everyday and kinestheatic movements. In addition, Mead develops a concept of
social processes that are characterized by the use of significant symbols. Using these
symbols is itself a process. The way the symbols are given to us is subject to a longterm change that has a historical and technical side. This long-term change can be
identified with the cultural and civilizing development of our western society. This is itself
an unstoppable process.

Algorithms and Digitization
In the following section I would like to turn to the processing of the digitally given world.
These are based on algorithms, as far as the computers are considered from a slightly
higher level than the mere current flows in the processors and power lines of a
computer. As we can show, there are also a whole series of interlocking processes in
the field of the digital, but their nature is decidedly different from the above-described
processes of organism and the living language of human beings. The whole area, which
is developed here, must be assigned to a media-philosophical perspective. An ethic of
the digital and the technique must turn to this area of philosophy in order to create a
basis for ethics. If this is not done, ethics usually remains speculative and simply does
not take into account the real possibilities which technology and, in the narrower sense,
digital technology can implement.
Algorithms - A brief Overview
Consequently, I would like to go further to find a general description of digital processing
and algorithms are the basis of doing the digital and processing the digital, respectively.
In introduction books for computer since and algorithm we find: An algorithm is a
self-contained step-by-step set of operations to be performed, this step-by-step
definition is only related to an objective time flow and in general is determined by
monocausalility "if that then do that", and all steps are isolated from each other.
Normally this is true for all kinds of programming language, it doesn't matter if you use
higher language or assembler, in a certain sense it is also a result of semiconductor
electronic and the whole p- and n-type dopants. If one actually goes back to the lowest
levels of computer technology, that is, the current flows and the electrical engineering of
semiconductor electronics, processing depends to a great extent on the technology of
the hardware. However, this is itself given by a step-by-step at the level of "power on"
and "power off". Of course, this must take into account the property of semiconductor
electronics, which made the digital revolution possible. The special feature of
semiconductor electronics consists in the fact that small electrical currents can control
large currents.
To get back to the algorithms that work on the higher technical levels, I would like
to give an illustrative example. It is a typical task for undergraduate students: Finding
the largest number in a list of numbers: a1, a2, …, an. Algorithm are best described by
sets of standard for flowcharts, which are defined by a so-called standard, i.e. ISO 5807
(Figure 2).

Start

i=1

Largest = a1

Does I = n?

End
Is a1 > largest?
Largest = ai

Largest = a1

Figure 2
What can already be recognized by this simple example is the nature of digital
processing. All steps are distinct and in the flow of execution there is no creative
continuous influence of the individual steps among each other. The only influence is
given by the regulation at the single steps itself. In media studies or media philosophy
processes are one of three basic media functions. The three media features are the
following (Winkler, 2015, p. 9):
1.) transmission (of analog/digitized information (Claude Shannon))
2.) saving/storing/recording
3.) processing
These three specific media functions go back to Friedrich Kittler (Kittler, 1985) and
certainly have their own historical development. In addition, these three media functions
represent a conceptual distinction. There are smooth transitions between them.
Considering the processing of the computer or the digital, this processing is obviously
determined by the computer and its architecture (soft- and hardware). Ultimately, this
happens through a spatial-temporal shift of characters, which are brought into a new
form of presentation. Winkler writes:
Computer prozessieren, indem sie Zeichen räumlich-zeitlich verschieben; [...]
Computer processes by moving characters spatial-temporally; [...]
(one translation, Winkler 2000, p. 13)
It is also about the generation of new information, which is not regulated ad hoc by a
spontaneity of the technical but by a determination of the operation. All random number

generators, too, are based on mathematical formulas, which in the last analysis is
based on the operation of fixed number spaces. A truly creative performance that goes
beyond this framework is not expected in digital processing. In addition, a whole range
of other candidates for processing the digital can also be used. Certainly, operating,
generating, and using information generally go along with it. In terms of media
philosophy, the concept of form plays a central role in outlining the concept of
processing the digital. Therefore, with reference to Sybille Krämer (Krämer, 1989),
Winkler highlights the transformation and transition of forms as a central moment of
processing: Processing is mostly technical change from one form to another (Winkler,
2015, p. 22). This is also true for the pure current in all computer devices. For example,
the form of storage by the technique of hysteresis is a mode of change of form. The
technique of hysteresis is a fundamental way of storage. One can thus generate
different states with memory, which are commonly referred to as zero and one or on
and off. This is one of the sources of digital processing.
As I mentioned earlier, the origin of this definition of processing in media theory
goes back to Krämer's theory of the operational (Krämer, 1989). Scripture and
textualization of computer programs are technically independent and ultimatel y operate
as a techné. This techné is nothing more than a bundling of practices, which addresses
an aspect of the performative. (Winkler, 2015, p. 25; Krämer, 1989, p. 4; Hernes, 2014).
Apart from the difference described above, there remains a general problem in
processing the digital as in processing the organism. Here we come back to Aristotelian
problem of identity and change: during processes something change and something
persists. Inevitably, this leads to another conceptual distinction, which is discussed in
the following section: Close and wide concept of processing.
Close and wide concept of processing
In order to meet the Aristotelian problem of simultaneous change and persistence, case
distinctions can be made. On the one hand, these case distinctions affect the levels that
can actually be identified on a computer as an overall process. On the other hand, one
should always also see the computer's causa finalis as a cultural object: In most cases,
we use the computer to effect a secular, especially non-digital, purpose of the world
around us. This leads to a media theoretically distinction between close and wide
concept of processing. The close concept tracks the actual chain of each
distinguishable level. These chains can themselves be represented in flow diagrams. At
each level there are interfaces to a higher level and between these interfaces there is
even a hard shift of the respective underlying forms of presentation:
1. Close concept of processing:
digital intervention at different levels
1.1 electical current → 1.2 processor →1.3 bus system → 1.4 primary memory,
1.5 operating system → 1.6 programming language (assembler or higher)→ ... →
1.X display representation → user
In this very simple example we find between each number the respective hard shifts of
one formal representation to another. Nonetheless, these hard shifts are monocausal
and define a clear distinction in the process of processing the digital. In this respect, the

differences to organismic processing become clear. The organism loses this way of
distinct and monocausal temporalizing. In fact, it can be seen from the OSI model that in
information technology, computer science and electrical engineering, this structuring of
a narrow concept of processing is given. The Open System Interconnection model (OSI
model) is multimodal and can be applied to completely different areas of computer
technology, network technology and wireless technology, as it is initially only an abstract
and nonspecific description of how layers an d interfaces interact at all (Ernst, 2016, p.
263-300). The following table gives an overview of the 7 levels, which must be taken
into account.

layer

Example

OSI-Modell

layer 7

Selection of information

Application Layer

layer 6

Reading, speaking, writing
→ encoding

Presentation Layer

layer 5

Support Identification

Session Layer

layer 4

datagram

Transport Layer

layer 3

Adressing, routing, traffic
control

Network Layer

layer 2

Address space/family
protocols

Data Link Layer

layer 1

Transmission/reception bit
stream

Physical Layer

As already mentioned, the broad concept of processing must take into account a
purpose that has an indication of something life-like. This broad concept implies, that
media-philosophically at least one medium remains untouched during processing. A
typical example is writing a message. In terms of our existing network culture, the
message between transmitter and receiver remains unaffected. Classic models of
information can be applied.
2. wide concept of processing:
In at least one respect Media remains unaffected:
Example sending an email: Sending is a process but with respect to the content
the mail should be the same for transmitter and receiver.
Clearly, these examples show that there is a conceptual distinction. Ultimately, there are
perspectives that are designed for the overall process. By all means, the example of
sending an email can also be analyzed in terms of a close concept of processing. If one
does this, then in this perspective the cultural aspect is lost. Sending the email is not
considered a social media practice. In general there are process chains of these

different digital processes. Consequently, all processes can be connected and depend
on each other, but they do not have to be.

Interactions – Processes Life-World and digitized World
In the last section I would like to merge the two developed thoughts. On the one hand,
we have a life-world, which is given in terms of its temporalization by spontaneity and a
stretched time consciousness. The latter can best be explained by Husserl's doctrine of
protention and retention. In the last section I would like to merge the two developed
thoughts. On the one hand, we have a life-world, which is given in terms of its
temporalizing by spontaneity and a stretched time consciousness. The latter can best
be explained by Husserl's doctrine of retention and retention. Here there need not be
monocausal connections between stages of time phases, but we can speak of an
anticipatory power of consciousness. This anticipatory power can not be fully achieved
through probabilities or neural networks. In terms of media philosophy, on the other
hand, there is a world of the digital, interspersed with algorithms. Their timing is given
by distinct step-by-step situations. There are monocausal structures with regard to
temporal developments. These monocausal structures can be found on all levels down
to the last level, the interaction between humans and computers. At least at this last
point, but certainly also before, arise mismatches between the time of the life-world and
the time of the digital world. Interestingly enough, life-time periods are needed to
remedy these mismatches. At least at this last point, but certainly also before, arise
mismatches between the time of the life-world and the time of the digital world.
Interestingly enough, life-time periods are needed to remedy these mismatches. These
life-world time periods of remedy can be very short but also very long. To clarify this, I
would like to give a few examples. According to the concern of the article, I use
examples to cover the areas, mentioned above, that already determine our daily life in
dealing with the digital. To put it briefly, I refer to the following areas: (1) digitization in
the literal sense, (2) datafication, (3) communication and (4) networking. In overview,
the examples are given in the following table:
Life-World

Digitized world

Problems in Interaction

- communication is enriched - all levels (from electrical idiomatic, metaphorical and
with affects, emotion and
layer (hardware), host
emotional understanding for
non-designativ elements layers, media layers) →only AI is usually not possible
(e.g. intonation, some micro clear designation and clear
→partial communicative
gestures)
semantic
dissonance
- human-environment
- computer-environment
→huge problems can arise
interaction is always flexible interaction strongly depend
in computer-dependent
within the flow of interaction
on algorithm, data base
decisions: high-frequency
→ anticipatory and felt,
based = a representation is
trading →decisions are
manly without
needed, inflexible since
made in milliseconds
representation, ethically
data and relations are
→problems are made in
enriched, → for most
given: computer are fast
human life-world

interaction: humans a slow
- human have
- only algorithm: step-by- → conflict human-computer
consciousness
step: (even neuronal
interaction: if the situated
/awareness of Gestalt in the network) → ability of finding cognition is important for
flow of experience
patterns of basal contour →
whole process of
→anticipatory ability for
no ability for the whole
understanding: mismatch
hole scene, all of this is
scene
between computer and
culturally framed
humans
As you can see from the examples, most of the digital handling problems that arise in
our network culture can be traced back to the temporal mismatches. It's because of the
time-digital inhibitions that we can not track our intended flow from the human side. In
addition, the process-philosophical approach shows the possibility of describing a
multitude of examples.

Conclusion and Outlook
I would like to summarize the core ideas of the article. Human behavioral processes are
increasingly determined by digital timing. This goes from simple examples, such as
preselection of words by text messaging, to areas of high frequency trading. Time
horizons of human consciousness is mostly Gestalt oriented and is always more than a
monocausal meaning structure. Fundamentally, this is given in time experience and can
not be simulated by computer programs since they are typically based on a step-by-step
algorithm which only reflect an objective and physical time structure. Conflicts result
from a mismatch between these types of time horizons. These conflicts in the vari ous
temporalizations are the source of most ethical issues. Therefore, a processphilosophical perspective provides a foundation for ethical problems of digitization.
Certainly, an open problem is given by the different time dimensions: long-term
phenomena and short-term phenomena. How should one capture the transformations of
the long-term phenomena by means of short-term phenomena? Ultimately, this goes
back to Mead's entire problematic: How to describe the change of the whole society? In
essence, Mead's thoughts need to be broadened by considerations of digital
processing.
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